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Abstract
In this paper, we defend a novel, multidimensional account of representational unifi-
cation, which we distinguish from integration. The dimensions of unity are simplicity,
generality and scope, non-monstrosity, and systematization. In our account, unifica-
tion is a graded property. The account is used to investigate the issue of how research
traditions contribute to representational unification, focusing on embodied cognition
in cognitive science. Embodied cognition contributes to unification even if it fails to
offer a grand unification of cognitive science. The study of this failure shows that uni-
fication, contrary to what defenders of mechanistic explanation claim, is an important
mechanistic virtue of research traditions.
Keywords Explanatory unification · Representational unification · Explanatory
integration · Mechanistic explanation · Embodied cognition · Research tradition
In cognitive science, to classify pieces of research one appeals to general approaches,
paradigms, frameworks or research perspectives—as these approaches are variously
called. Just how these contribute to cognitive explanations requires a comprehensive
analysis. We claim that one of their roles is representational unification. In the past,
the proponents of mechanistic explanation have mostly focused on integration, as
exemplified in the rich study of interfield integration in life sciences (Craver and
Darden 2013; Darden and Maull 1977). But there is further insight to be gained by
looking at why explanations are considered unified or not.
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Unification is a recurring theme in the debate over theories of cognition. Many fear
that interdisciplinary cognitive research may fall prey to extreme fragmentation (e.g.,
Newell 1973). This fragmentation may, in turn, cause duplication of effort and a lack
of understanding. While various approaches have been proposed to achieve unifica-
tion in cognitive science, from the study of cognitive architectures (e.g., Newell 1990),
through unifying modelling methodologies (e.g., Eliasmith and Anderson 2003), to
unifying frameworks such as predictive coding (Friston 2010), there has been less
focus on how these researchers understand unification and on how to assess the uni-
ficatory success of a given approach to the study of cognition. Some ascribe such
success to embodied cognition (e.g., Glenberg 2010; Schubert and Semin 2009). In
this paper, we hope to address both questions from the mechanistic perspective by
sketching an account of how these approaches may contribute to the representational
unity of cognitive science. In effect, we defend a novel, multidimensional account of
representational unification.
The paper unfolds as follows: first, we argue that the variegated, and sometimes
contrasting approaches that are grouped under the label ‘embodied cognition’ (EC)
are best viewed as a research tradition in the sense defined by Laudan (1977). In
contrast to Larry Shapiro (2007), we argue that embodied cognition is not a nebulous
research program but a diversified research tradition. In Sect. 2, we argue that the
research agenda of EC should not be understood in terms of a single abstract claim.
Instead of proposing yet another definition of EC, we argue that it is best understood
as exemplified and constituted by a number of similar approaches that retain only
a few common metaphysical and methodological commitments. In the subsequent
section, we focus on the unificatory role of these commitments in cognitive science
and argue for a dimensioned view of representational unification. Then we turn to the
issue of how a research tradition can be evaluated. We point out that the failure to unify
phenomena is at the core of recent harsh criticism offered by Goldinger et al. (2016).
In our view, however, this criticism is not entirely justified because it confuses a grand
research tradition with detailed models by requiring EC to feature the degree of detail
typical of models. In conclusion, we argue that our approach enriches the mechanistic
perspective on the dynamics of scientific progress by stressing the importance of
unification of explanatory projects, even when unification progresses in a piecemeal
fashion, distributed among a number of publications in a research tradition.
1 From a research program to a research tradition
EC has been characterized by Shapiro as a research program. To justify his termi-
nological choice, he contends that “the point of labelling EC a research programme,
rather than a theory, is to indicate that the commitments and subject matters of EC
remain fairly nebulous” (Shapiro 2007, p. 338). This strikes us as odd.
First of all, the notion of the research program is by no means nebulous in philo-
sophical usage. It was coined by Lakatos (1970) as an alternative to the Kuhnian notion
of a paradigm (Kuhn 1962), which, some claim, is extremely ambiguous in Kuhn’s
work (Masterman 1970). Shapiro neither cites Lakatos in his paper (perhaps because
of a strict word limit), nor does he introduce his own understanding of research pro-
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grams. Thus, we may plausibly suppose that he tacitly assumes the analysis offered
by Lakatos.
Most likely, Shapiro supposes that research programs play different roles from the-
ories and should therefore not be evaluated by exactly the same standards as theories.
Indeed, the notion of a research program has its advantages when compared to the
notion of a theory, especially where historical development is concerned. As Lakatos
pointed out, it can be used to compare different programs and to choose the most
progressive ones. While component theories in a given program may fail, the grand
assumptions may retain their explanatory and heuristic power. This may be of utmost
importance in the debate over EC: most of its proponents repeatedly claim that their
assumptions are in some sense more appropriate than the mainstream approaches to
the study of cognition, although they do not pretend to have a complete theory of cog-
nition (e.g., Barsalou 2008; Goldman 2012; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008). If this
is the right way to interpret Shapiro’s claim, it would follow that we might compare
research programs without begging methodological questions in cognitive science; we
hope to settle at least some of the current hot debates.
For example, Livins and Doumas (2012) criticize EC by claiming that it is not really
falsifiable because it can adapt to different outcomes of experimental interventions.
But falsification of research programmes, according to Lakatos, is not a question of
a single experiment that decides that a specific theory does not hold; instead, one
should see whether a change of assumptions of the theory make it possible to predict
and explain new facts. Research programmes are less easily falsifiable than specific
theories but their progress (or lack thereof) is crucial for determining whether they are
degenerate or not.
Unfortunately, there are reasons to believe that impartial evaluation of research pro-
grams becomes markedly difficult if we adopt Lakatos’s framework. Notwithstanding
its lasting influence on scientific practice, including cognitive science (cf. Cooper
2006), it imposes ill-justified burdens. Lakatos is indebted to Popper in his reliance on
empirical novelty as the ultimate proof of scientific progress. But progress need not
come in the form of new scientific evidence; for example, Copernicus had no better
empirical evidence than his competitors. His account of astronomy was not simply
more mathematically parsimonious than the Ptolemean model (Kuhn 1957). Coper-
nicus’s advantage was largely theoretical, as Laudan (1977) has argued. Laudan also
stresses that not all science focuses exclusively on attaining new empirical predictions.
According to Lakatos, however, some branches of science—such as mathematics or
theoretical modelling—could never be evaluated as progressive, even if they had their
own research programs and successes. They would be degenerate by definition as
long they could not contribute to new empirical predictions.1 However, the intention
behind the idea of developing the account of progressive programs was to claim that
degeneration arises from adding auxiliary hypotheses ad libitum just to protect the
essential claims of a theory (cf. Lakatos 1970, p. 117), instead of developing it further.
1 Of course, Lakatos, with his stress on quasi-empirical nature of mathematics (1976), could reply that
the ultimate proof of progress, even in mathematics, is empirical. This reply, plausible as it may sound,
implies that formalist approaches in mathematics are degenerate by definition. Even if one is highly critical of
Bourbaki, for example, one should not terminologically decide that their approach can never be progressive.
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Laudan proposed a fruitful alternative that we adopt here. Instead of presupposing
that science is merely concerned with generating novel empirical predictions, he argues
that science should solve problems, theoretical or empirical. In other words, if EC
is progressive, it should solve its empirical or theoretical problems. As we stress
below in Sect. 4, the evaluation depends on what one takes to be the problem of EC.
In particular, if it is a grand unifying theory of cognition, it should help solve all
problems of cognitive science, and the failure to do so is detrimental. If one adopts a
view that EC complements traditional cognitive science, then it should be progressive
in solving more and more complementary problems such as mapping information flow
in sensorimotor networks, critical for adaptivity, robustness, and learning (Lungarella
and Sporns 2006).
While proposing that new approach to evaluating research programs, Laudan also
reinterprets the very notion of the research program; to avoid any confusion, he refers
to his version as a research tradition. Research traditions are characterized by three fea-
tures: (a) “every research tradition has a number of specific theories which exemplify
and partially constitute it” (Laudan 1977, p. 78); (b) they exhibit “certain metaphysical
and methodological commitments which, as an ensemble, individuate the research tra-
dition and distinguish it from others” (ibid.); (c) lastly, traditions go through a number
of formulations and usually have a long history (ibid., p. 79).
Thus, research traditions in Laudan’s sense are more “nebulous”, at least in the
sense that their identity is no longer the matter of adhering to their essential claims.
All that is required for a theory or model to belong to a certain tradition is for it
to bear a certain resemblance to the prototype model, theory or theories that have
initiated the tradition and, arguably, some historical continuity in terms of problems
assumed to be crucial for the tradition to solve.2 Thus, research traditions are not
treated in an essentialist manner, but rather like growing and varied populations of
constituent theories or frameworks—or an evolving, dynamic network of theories or
approaches. Moreover, traditions are generally stated in a more abstract fashion than
specific theories. In this sense, one could see evolutionary theory (which is, according
to Laudan, actually a research tradition and not a theory per se) as more “nebulous”:
it is less easily testable and much more abstract than any specific explanatory model
or text in the life sciences.
In the next section, we will analyse EC as a research tradition.
2 EC as a research tradition in cognitive science
There is no shortage of attempts to characterize EC in an essentialist manner as a series
of its essential claims (e.g., Goldinger et al. 2016; M. Wilson 2002). For example, Chiel
and Beer summarize EC in a single sentence: “body structure creates constraints and
2 We understand research traditions to be similar, in this respect, to fields of science, characterized by
Darden and Maull (1977) as consisting of four elements: “a central problem, a domain consisting of items
taken to be facts related to that problem, general explanatory factors and goals providing expectations as
to how the problem is to be solved, techniques and methods, and, sometimes, but not always, concepts,
laws and theories which are related to the problem and which attempt to realize the explanatory goals”
(p. 43). The difference is that in a given field, multiple traditions may appear with different metaphysical
and methodological commitments, which need not be shared by all researchers in that field.
123
Synthese
opportunities for neural control” (Chiel and Beer 1997, p. 553). A similar but slightly
more complex account is offered by Wilson and Foglia (2017): “The body can function
as a constraint on cognition, as a distributor for cognitive processing, or as a regulator
of cognitive activity.”
While such attempts to define EC may serve a didactic purpose, they simplify or
even distort the historical dynamics of the tradition. Three distinct functions listed
by Wilson and Foglia were not considered by early theorists of embodiment, such as
Lakoff and Johnson (1980), and with time, more functions can appear—their list is not
logically exhaustive. Therefore, we do not treat these characteristics as defining EC.
They only hint at possible theories that are part of EC as a genuinely grand research
tradition.
As we indicated above, instead of defining traditions in terms of a single claim or
even a single theory, Laudan’s approach is to demonstrate that the research tradition
is exemplified and constituted by a number of constituent specific theories. In other
words, research traditions need not be simple or intrinsically unified; they may be
complex and intrinsically varied. A single tradition could, we submit, subsume a
number of smaller traditions, which we call subtraditions for brevity. Constituent
subtraditions are, in turn, exemplified and constituted by detailed models and theories.
In the case of EC, these subtraditions include neo-empiricism (Barsalou 1999, 2008),
ecological psychology (Gibson 1986; Wilson and Golonka 2013), embodied cognitive
linguistics (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), research on emotion and interoception (Herbert
and Pollatos 2012), and sensorimotor approaches to cognition (O’Regan and Noë 2001;
Thelen et al. 2001; Chemero 2009), including the vast and varied research on mirror
neurons (Arbib 2012; Gallese et al. 2004), morphological computation in robotics
(Pfeifer and Bongard 2007), and the skin–brain thesis (Keijzer et al. 2013). One may
also include enactivism with its various flavors (Stewart et al. 2010).3
An overview of how we see these different approaches as related is offered in
Fig. 1.
The identity of research traditions is not decided only by their methodological
and metaphysical commitments, though these remain the focus of most attempts to
define research approaches such as EC. According to Laudan, these commitments are,
however, also important for singling out a research tradition among other traditions.
Indeed, the stress on the role of bodily structures in the control of behavior distinguishes
EC from classical symbolic cognitive science.
In short, we claim that EC should be understood as composed of multiple, and
sometimes quite extensive, component research subtraditions.4 No wonder, then, EC
is not as uniform as a single theory. Some of the constituent EC subtraditions are
in direct competition and assume mutually contradictory theoretical commitments.
For example, neo-empiricism is usually committed to (so-called grounded) symbolic
representations, while radical sensorimotor approaches tend to eschew symbolic rep-
resentationalism. Some reduce the bodily aspect of cognition to body representations
3 The term enactivism has already become ambiguous (Ward et al. 2017).
4 Here, we abstract away from the question of how EC is related to previous approaches to cognition
such as cybernetics or phenomenology. We suspect that a deeper inquiry could reveal overlap (perhaps
even substantial overlap) between embodied and non-embodied approaches to cognition. For our purposes,
however, we need not assume that EC is wholly distinct from other approaches in cognitive science.
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Fig. 1 Subtraditions of embodied cognition. Spatial overlap represents the partial overlap of traditions;
however, the size of each subtradition is arbitrarily adjusted to make overlaps possible. Drawing © authors
of the paper
(Goldman 2012), and others focus on the physical body (Pfeifer and Bongard 2007).
Moreover, boundaries between subtraditions of EC are difficult to draw, as they are
intrinsically varied. For example, computational methodology and embodied represen-
tations do not fall within the strict boundaries of single subtraditions: Lungarella and
Sporns, along with Pfeiffer and Bongard, belong to a different subtradition than Pez-
zulo et al. (2011). The latter embrace theoretical commitments of so-called grounded
cognition (Barsalou 2008) in contrast to the former. Any attempt to define EC in terms
of metaphysical and methodological commitments shared by all its proponents will
necessarily abstract away from all this complexity, which will in turn make such a
definition uninformative about the real richness and diversity of EC subtraditions.
The core metaphysical and methodological commitments of EC are exemplified by
its particular subtraditions. A particularly influential one, owing to the large number
of empirical results in experimental psychology it has inspired, is embodied cognitive
linguistics (henceforth ECL), founded mostly by George Lakoff and his collaborators
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980).
Lakoff (2012) points out problems that prompted him, as a generative linguist, in
the early 1960s (long before any embodied approach was proposed), to adopt a more
embodied way of thinking. He discovered that he could not solve relevant problems
using methods and concepts of the then-dominant generative linguistics. Two example
sentences of import are: “Yastrzemski doubled to left” and “If I were you, I’d hate
me.” Both, for different reasons, challenge the tradition in which Lakoff was trained.
Understanding one requires bodily understanding of the movement of the ball (e.g.,
the meaning of the term “double” and “left” in the first case, taken from baseball), and
understanding the other requires attributing the location of consciousness (to realize
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who is actually hated by whom). As Lakoff claims, such examples were quite common
and formative for future development of embodied research in cognitive linguistics.
Moreover, they were difficult to analyze in the traditional terms of Chomsky’s linguis-
tics, where the primary stress lay on syntax, while meaning was usually held to be
arbitrarily attributed to symbols, or syntactic entities. However, problems or anoma-
lies alone are not enough for a tradition to thrive. An alternative framework must be
proposed.
In Lakoff’s opinion, the alternative framework was already present in four studies,
offered as lectures in Berkeley in the mid-1970s, which made possible the further devel-
opment of EC. The first is Kay and McDaniel’s (1978) work on the role of physiology
and morphology of the visual system in color vision. The second is Eleanor Rosch’s
work on prototypes—basic-level categories dependent on embodiment, mainly on the
gestalt, perception, mental imagery and motor programs (Rosch et al. 1976). The
third is cognitive primitives (cogs, or “image schemas”) influenced by the body, pro-
posed independently but in parallel by Talmy (1983) and Langacker (1987). Finally,
the fourth is Fillmore’s (1977) account of semantic roles as dependent on embod-
ied notions such as agents, sources, goals, etc. Taken together, these studies supplied
new metaphysical and methodological commitments for the emergence of ECL and
research on embodied conceptual metaphors.
ECL rejects the assumption of amodal symbols with arbitrarily assigned meaning.
Instead, it relies on cogs and their relationship to the body, combined with embod-
ied experience and conceptual metaphors. Thus, meaning is mediated by the bodily
structures of a human being. The focus is on embodied experiences in the formation,
development, and cross-cultural character of primary metaphors, emotion metaphors,
and metonymies, as well as on relations between conceptual metaphors and gestural
metaphors, etc. (Cienki 2005; Duncan et al. 2007; Kövecses 1986; Lakoff and John-
son 1999; McNeill 1992). Lakoff (2012, pp. 776–778) enumerated more than twenty
important results of ECL.
While ECL remains heavily opposed to disembodied work in linguistics and arti-
ficial intelligence, over the years, it has also developed an original approach toward
the computational modeling of cognition. This is evident, for example, in Lakoff’s
general framework, Neural Theory of Thought and Language (NTTL), which moves
beyond linguistics (Lakoff 2012, pp. 778–781). This line of ECL research is still very
much under construction. Although it is closely related to other prominent domains of
EC, such as mirror neurons or sensorimotor integration, it has not developed beyond
the narrow circle of Lakoff’s collaborators. Still, such historical development could
be difficult to predict, given the mostly conceptual arguments and small case studies
in his early work with Johnson (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). This, again, illustrates that
research traditions usually change over time, as Laudan stresses in his account.
ECL is not the only subtradition of EC of interest to us. One can also easily point to
work on affordances, mirror neurons, or interoception and emotion (see again Fig. 1).
Let us briefly focus on the subtradition spawned by affordance research. The initial
formulation of the concept was proposed by Gibson (1986) in his work to define the
field of ecological psychology. Subsequently, reformulations were proposed, some
forced by ontological considerations (Turvey 1992), and some inspired by a change in
the domain of application (Gaver 1991; Norman 1999). But at that time, this concept
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and related studies were only recognized rather locally, by ecological psychologists,
and by few cognitive researchers.
The idea re-emerged in recent studies on (radically) embodied cognition (Chemero
2009) and seems to flourish. This led to studies of complex affordances (Rietveld and
Kiverstein 2014), social and canonical affordances (Costall 1995, 2012), and normative
affordances (Heras-Escribano and de Pinedo 2016). The concept was also applied
to research in human–computer interaction (Kaptelinin and Nardi 2012), robotics
(Chemero and Turvey 2007), and neuroscience (Cisek 2007).
A closer analysis shows that only a few researchers developed their own approaches
to affordances. The focus is usually on the relationship between body and environment,
possibilities for action in such environments, and the role of this particular relationship
in perception and cognition in general. The methodological and metaphysical com-
mitments of this subtradition usually take inspiration from Gibson’s direct realism,
which was heavily criticized by defenders of classical cognitive psychology (Fodor
and Pylyshyn 1981). Thus, again, this subtradition is, on the one hand, based on a
specific theoretical framework, and, on the other hand, heavily opposed to the view
that cognition is the processing of amodal symbols.
Members of the affordance subtradition often share the same or significantly sim-
ilar metaphysical commitments regarding the role of the body and its action and
morphology in cognition or perception but assume relatively independent ways of
conceptualizing and solving problems, which means that their commitments diverge.
Some follow in the steps of Gibson by developing ecological psychology with its
rejection of mental representation, which can be also extended by dynamical expla-
nations (Wilson and Golonka 2013). Others, especially neuroscientists investigating
brain mechanisms involved in controlling the interactions between an organism and
its environment, focus on “representations of affordances” as realized by a specific
activity of certain brain systems (Cisek 2007). A similarly representational approach
is assumed in design research (Gaver 1991; Norman 1999), which examines the prop-
erties of objects and how these properties are used, perceived, and represented.
As we stress the differences between various subtraditions of EC, one could object
that EC is not really a coherent approach to cognition. Thus, before EC could unify
cognitive science, shouldn’t it be unified itself? Our reply to this line of argument is
relatively simple: as we demonstrate below, there could be some unificatory power in
views that are not fully unified. In other words, unification is a graded property.
3 A new perspective on unification in EC
In spite of its heterogeneity, some consider EC a unifying perspective for virtually
all cognitive science (Glenberg 2010; Schubert and Semin 2009). Psychology and
cognitive science are now obviously disunified. Still, defenders of the idea of unity
argue that these fields should become, eventually, somehow unified.
How, then, should EC unify research? Glenberg claims that EC can unify research on
social and cognitive development; memory; social psychology and emotions; motor
resonance, theory of mind, autism; psychopathology and clinical psychology; and
applied clinical psychology. It is an impressive list, even if some fields of psychology
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are missing (the obvious being perception and decision-making). Of course, he does
not deny that EC has not unified these research fields yet. Thus, we need a way to
evaluate the plausibility of his claim.
To do this, we assume the new mechanistic approach to explanation, which will
make our task at the same time easy and rather novel, as unity is rarely seen as a
mechanistic virtue (Craver 2007; but see Miłkowski 2016a). According to the new
mechanistic approach, to explain phenomenon P constitutively is to describe a mech-
anism responsible for P (Craver 2007; Glennan 2017; Machamer et al. 2000). If
appropriately orchestrated, the constituents of the mechanism, or its parts or enti-
ties, perform certain operations or activities and interact causally, leading to the fact
that P is produced, maintained, or otherwise constituted.
Mechanistic explanatory texts may be produced on a case-by-case basis, but one
of the reasons research traditions endure is that they offer researchers exemplar
explanations upon which to base their own proposals. By exemplar explanations we
mean explanations that are considered particularly successful and which serve as pat-
terns to be followed (for instance, in computational cognitive science, Marr’s (1982)
explanations of edge detection are exemplars). If these exemplar explanations are
appropriately constrained by theoretical and/or methodological commitments, then
the derived explanations will resemble the original explanation. In this way, a poten-
tially huge part of the space of possible explanations will be left unexplored. But at the
same time, researchers may save substantial effort by extrapolating the same principle
to new phenomena. Intuitively, adherence to some theoretical and/or methodologi-
cal commitments of a tradition will contribute to a greater theoretical unity of the
explanations produced in this tradition.
This intuitive claim requires further elucidation. However, it is far from clear
whether one can offer a general analysis of the notion of unity in science (Hacking
1996). Margaret Morrison (2011) even claims that a unified theory of unity is unattain-
able. To make matters worse, unification, in particular in the context of mechanistic
explanations, is frequently conflated with integration: for example, Craver (2007)
talks of “mosaic unity”, when he means patchwork integration of multiple models.
This conflation is quite common (e.g., Grantham 2004; Fagan 2017).
Let us first define and distinguish integration from unification, and then characterize
the latter. Integration has been understood by Craver (2007) in terms of constraints
on the space of possible mechanisms: the more mechanisms constrain one other in
different respects, the smaller the space of possible mechanisms we must explore to
find the real causes of phenomena. A version of this approach, expressed in terms of
constraints on plausible models of mechanisms, and not just mechanisms, is defended
by Miłkowski (2016b). In his account, to integrate a set of models of mechanisms, one
should find the most coherent model that preserves all constraints from all constituent
models (Thagard 2000). We could, for example, integrate results from ECL with results
from sensorimotor research (Pezzulo 2011); this is the usual approach in EC.
The integrated mechanism model may also be extremely complex, just like a Rube
Goldberg machine. There is no warranty it will generalize to other similar phenom-
ena or that it will be simple. In other words, even maximally integrated scientific
representations can be—intuitively speaking—disunified.
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What is unity, then? We submit that unification is a multifaceted achievement,
with multiple dimensions that depend not only on its target (reality, method, set of
laws, language, theory) but also on the ways such unity may be achieved. Here, we
are interested in the unity of an explanatory text, understood as one that explains its
phenomena mechanistically, and we follow Boone and Piccinini (2016) in claiming
that this kind of explanation is suitable for cognitive (neuro)science. We call this kind
of unity representational, as its target is an explanatory representation of a mechanism.
For representational unity, however, the unity of language is not required (mechanisms
may be explained verbally, using diagrams, equations, etc.).5
Arguably, at least four dimensions of representational unity can be singled out:
(1) simplicity and non-redundancy; (b) generality and scope; (c) organic fertility, or
non-monstrosity; and (d) systematization. Our account draws on Miłkowski (2016a),
while adding one important dimension, which was missing in our previous account,
viz. systematization. These dimensions can be seen as virtues of explanatory texts in
general.
Dimensions of representational unity cannot be straightforwardly applied to
research traditions. It is scientific representations, not traditions, that are supposed
to be unified. In cognitive science, these representations are usually stated as particu-
lar computational models in terms of flowcharts, boxes-and-arrows, or mathematical
descriptions (Cooper and Guest 2014), but they may be also specified verbally, or as
complex diagrams of the mechanisms involved. These representations tend to be of
limited scope; some of them explain a single phenomenon, which, in extreme cases,
is the behavior of a single subject in a single task over a single session. Such represen-
tations are sometimes called microtheories (Newell and Simon 1972). The problem
is that when a field uses microtheories to explain phenomena, there is a danger of
appealing to divergent theoretical principles in explaining even related classes of phe-
nomena, which may lead to eclectic ad hoc models (Newell 1973). The framework
of mechanistic explanation does not, per se, view such eclecticism as detrimental to
the quality of the explanations at hand. Nonetheless, such fragmentation may be a
symptom of the lack of a systematic body of explanatory principles governing a class
of phenomena.
To avoid the charge that similar phenomena are explained ad hoc using diver-
gent theoretical principles, a cognitive scientist may either increase the scope of the
explanatory representation in question, or produce individual representations using the
same or a similar set of theoretical principles, following exemplars from a research
tradition. The first solution was defended forcefully by Newell (1990), who argued
that a single model—depicting a cognitive architecture—should explain a vast range
of cognitive phenomena. The alternative solution, which is widespread in the case of
EC, is distributed unification, which follows basic metaphysical and methodological
commitments of EC as a research tradition.
In practical terms, particular models are usually produced under an umbrella of a
specific subtradition of EC. It is hoped that a number of explanations, distributed over a
5 Use of the same vocabulary may not imply representational unity; a theory expressed in the same language
could be disunified if it is not organically fertile (e.g., when it contains a mere logical conjunction of two
confirmationally independent propositions). See later in the text for a more detailed elucidation of organic
fertility.
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series of publications, will offer, nonetheless, a unified picture of phenomena because
they are constrained by the same theoretical principles of EC. In the case of distributed
unification, the properties of unified representations should be therefore applied to a
whole distributed corpus of explanations offered currently in a given tradition for a
number of related phenomena. This corpus is kept theoretically unified in particular
by following influential exemplar explanations of a given subtradition.
Thus, our notion of representational unification may be applied both to a mono-
lithic specification of a mechanism in a single publication (usually a book) and to
a mosaic model of a mechanism, whose description is distributed over a number of
publications. This notion of distributed unification is indebted to an observation made
by Hochstein (2016), who noted that mechanistic explanations usually span a number
of separate publications. In our view, this idea of distribution is equally applicable to
representational unification.
Let us now turn to unification. First, a representation may be said to be unified
when it is in some sense simple and non-redundant. Explanatory texts and models with
needlessly complex and repeated parts are disunified, while they could be perfectly
integrated in the mechanistic sense. For example, one could integrate two explanations
of how the meaning of a complex expression depends on meanings of its constituents.
One could rely on the standard notion of compositionality, and another on Lakoff’s
(1987) alternative, the notion of motivation, which was supposed to replace composi-
tionality altogether, by claiming that one applies to, say, abstract concepts, and another
to concrete ones. Needless to say, such an integrated explanation is not unified, as it
mechanically connects two disconnected positions.
Technically, one could define simplicity in statistical or information-theoretic terms
[e.g., Akaike information criterion (Forster and Sober 1994) or Salomonoff–Kol-
mogorov complexity (Li and Vitanyi 1993)]. EC explanatory texts, if they repeatedly
appeal to the same explanatory mechanisms—such as mirror neurons—in multiple
explanations, are in this sense unifying: they offer general explanatory patterns, which,
if true, render the explanatory text simpler, as far as these mechanisms do not involve
significant additional overhead. For example, one could claim that a needlessly com-
plicated representation, even if applied to multiple phenomena, is still not really unified
if it requires introducing additional linking or intervening mechanisms.
Second, the generality of an explanatory text, or its explanatory scope, is often
taken to be the feature of a unified explanation (Kitcher 1989). Alternatively, one
could analyze this feature of explanatory texts as the level of invariance of regularities
or causal structures in mechanisms. Again, take mirror neurons: the more phenomena
that could be explained by recourse to the purported embodied mechanisms of action
simulation, the bigger the explanatory scope of EC. As we will see in Sect. 4, this
is the feature of unification that critics think EC lacks: the charges mounted against
EC by Goldinger et al. (2016) can be summarized as pointing to a possible lack of
invariant generalizations true of all cognitive phenomena. However, at the same time,
as long as sensorimotor mechanisms (whatever we take them to be) explain a large
range of action-perception phenomena, they are unificatory in this regard.
Third, unified representations are “organic wholes”: they are characterized by
organic fertility, as Watkins (1984) called it. More recently, this feature of scientific
representations has been analyzed in terms of non-monstrosity by Votsis (2015). To
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simplify, a representation is monstrous only when it is a merely superficial collection
of disjoined parts, for example, a conjunction of logically and statistically independent
claims. Intuitively, if there are parts of a representation that cannot be disconfirmed by
the same proposition, the representation is monstrous.6 Now, as long EC is merely a
diverse collection of hypotheses about the role of the body that remain disconnected, it
could be monstrous (as our Fig. 1 could suggest). However, in spite of methodological
and theoretical differences, there may be a series of unifying principles common to
at least some subtraditions of EC, which would be falsified if, for example, it turns
out that mirror neurons have an extremely limited (if any) influence on reasoning or
language—as Hickok (2014) suggests.
Fourth, unified representations are not just simple, organically fertile representa-
tions of grand ambition and scope. The inference patterns in explanations, which are,
according to Kitcher (1989), the necessary tools for unification, cannot constitute
a mere collection of arbitrary axioms, even if they are confirmationally connected,
or non-monstrous, and non-redundant. They should systematically elucidate reality
(Bartelborth 2002). The idea that systematicity is the defining feature of science has
been recently proposed by Hoyningen-Huene (2013) but it was already one of the
requirements in the account of reduction defended by Kemeny and Oppenheim (1956).
Kemeny and Oppenheim insisted that the reducing theory should be as well (or bet-
ter) systematized as the theory reduced. As they say, “Without the requirement of
systematization we cannot even understand the need for theories” (ibid., p. 11).
We consider systematization a necessary feature of any scientific discourse.
Hoyningnen-Huene stresses that manifestations of systematicity depend on what kind
of scientific discourse is meant.7 In our case it is mechanistic explanations in cogni-
tive (neuro)science (including microtheories). The claim we defend, therefore, is that
unified representations should offer systematic mechanistic explanations and descrip-
tions of their phenomena, striving at completeness in terms of particular explanations
and of the whole range of phenomena. Moreover, they should aim at systematiza-
tion just because they are theoretical representations but also because, as unified, they
aim to explain the whole range of phenomena in a uniform way. Even if there are
several kinds of phenomena to be explained, there could be underlying principles of
taxonomy or periodization of the phenomena at hand that show that they are system-
atically related. Thus, because they look at connections between phenomena, unified
6 To spell this idea out in a satisfactory manner, Votsis had to use much more logical artillery, whose
introduction would require too much space. For full details of his account, see Votsis (2015). The disconfir-
matory proposition need not be empirical, so this account should also be applicable to the non-monstrosity
of formal sciences.
7 His account of systematicity is also multi-dimensional; instead of offering a cluster of properties that are
jointly paradigmatic for systematic theories, he is concerned with different dimensions of science itself.
These dimensions are descriptions, explanations, predictions, the defense of knowledge claims, critical
discourse, epistemic connectedness, an ideal of completeness, knowledge generation, and the representation
of knowledge. As Hoyningnen-Huene argues, systematicity of descriptions is not the same property as
the systematicity of the defense of knowledge claims. The first is related to axiomatization, creation of
taxonomies, periodization, quantification, and empirical generalizations, and the latter with systematic
attempts to reduce error in science, which is related to how knowledge is defended, including non-evidential
considerations, empirical generalizations, causal influence, etc.
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theoretical representations are systematic. Otherwise, they become fragmented and
explanatory pluralism is forced.
One intuitive way researchers in cognitive science try to achieve systematic expla-
nations is to appeal to a multilevel, or stratified structure of cognitive processes. In
this regard, the three-level account of computational explanation in cognitive science
defended by Marr (1982) is a prime example of stratifying cognitive reality with the
goal of providing complete computational explanations (completeness is one of the
features of systematicity cited by Hoyningen-Huene). EC is usually presented, as
is most cognitive research, as offering multilevel explanations in a Marrian fashion.
Interestingly, Hoyningen-Huene subsumes axiomatization, periodization, creation of
taxonomies, and the like, under the dimension of description. Nonetheless, researchers
devise methodological precepts aimed at achieving completeness of explanations, and
not just descriptions, by systematically covering explanatorily relevant factors.
The purpose of Marrian levels is exactly to provide complete explanations by cov-
ering essential factors. Marr’s levels are defined by general research questions rather
than by a strict organizational hierarchy with a clearly defined ordering relationship.
For example, at the computational level, one is preoccupied with the following ques-
tions: “what is the goal of computation?”, “why is it appropriate?”, and “what is the
logic of the strategy by which it can be carried out?”. The subsequent algorithmic
level deals with the questions “how can this computational theory be implemented?”,
“what is the representation for the input and output?”, and “what is the algorithm for
the transformation?”. Without further elucidating Marr’s framework, we want to stress
that it holds the promise of systematic inquiry into complex information-processing
systems. By answering the series of questions, one should arrive at a complete expla-
nation of how a complex information-processing system works. One of the enduring
attractions of Marrian methodology in cognitive science is that it specifies clearly
what research questions should be asked, in what sequence, and what the end result
should look like. However, contra Hoyningen-Huene, these systematic questions are
not just cases of systematic description but of systematic explanation. In other words,
Marr’s stratification of complex systems is aimed at producing unified explanations
in computational cognitive science.
Thus, as long EC produces mechanistic explanatory representations that are simple,
general, non-monstrous, and systematic, it can contribute to representational unifica-
tion in cognitive science, in spite of the diversity of methodological and theoretical
commitments of EC. Essentially, it can still contribute to representational unification
by elucidating a range of cognitive phenomena by recourse to the same mechanisms
(or at least the same kinds of mechanism), which results in simpler and more general
explanations. Researchers aim to provide non-monstrous and systematic explanations,
which tend to be more consistent if constrained by particular subtraditions of EC. Thus,
even though EC is diversified and does not offer a single unified view of embodiment,
its explanatory texts exhibit a certain pattern, which is evidence that they are not
entirely ad hoc and eclectic, at least not in the way described and criticized by Newell
(1973) in his complaints against fragmentation of cognitive psychology.
Notably, only some of defenders of EC, like Glenberg, seem to suggest that EC
may offer complete explanations at least for some domains in psychology and that
the body serves as their unifying principle. But the body is conceptualized in different
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ways depending on the subtradition and does not always play the same role. Hence,
the only thing that the reference to bodily factors in mechanistic explanations can do,
in principle, is to constrain the models of mechanisms by requiring that they cite these
factors. This is, however, insufficient for a systematic unity of explanatory models
over all subtraditions of EC because these factors are themselves poorly understood,
and different subtraditions cite their favorite bodily factors, which may remain unre-
lated to those favored by other EC subtraditions. For instance, Pfeifer and Bongard
(2007) consider body morphology the crucial factor shaping our cognitive processes,
while for Goldman (2012), body morphology is irrelevant. Both approaches also have
opposing attitudes toward the role of interception in cognition. Hence, while EC works
against extreme disunity and fragmentation, its diversity still contributes to divergent
explanatory practices and, consequently, divergent explanatory models of cognitive
phenomena. This diversity and intellectual rivalry inside research traditions need not
be considered detrimental for unity (van Strien 1987).
This leads to another question. Even if EC traditions may contribute to some repre-
sentational unity in cognitive science, it is still questionable whether it may eventually
unify all of cognitive science. How, then, should one evaluate the success of EC in the
context of representational unification?
4 Evaluating evolving research traditions in light of unification:
lessons from embodied cognition
EC is a research tradition. While citing evidential support is sufficient for endorsing
one theory over another or for rejecting it as flawed, empirical evidence may not be
enough to justify endorsing or rejecting a research tradition. In their criticism of EC,
Goldinger et al. (2016) discuss nine phenomena for which EC offers no predictions
nor explanations, such as the word frequency effect. The word frequency effect com-
prises the fact that the more frequently used the word, the faster and more robust
its lexical access becomes. Goldinger et al. deny that this phenomenon could ever
be explained by EC. However, other research traditions in cognitive science fare no
better. Computationalism as such offers no predictions, for it merely affords com-
putational explanations in cognitive science but has nothing to say about the word
frequency effect. This is because computationalism is not a single theory but a varied
research tradition that is methodologically committed to computational modelling and
ontologically committed to claims about physical computation in cognitive systems
(cf. Miłkowski 2018). But empirically valid computational models of the word fre-
quency effect could eventually be built. Similarly, one could argue that it is possible
to build an embodied explanation of the phenomenon (we will return to this issue
shortly).
Moreover, no matter if a research tradition is unificatory or not, it may be very
difficult to disconfirm it empirically, in particular when their metaphysical commit-
ments are extremely abstract.8 Indeed, Laudan stressed that research traditions, in
8 Of course, it can turn out that one of the metaphysical commitments of a research tradition is wrong:
for example, a huge research tradition in physics assumed the existence of luminiferous aether, and the
Michelson-Morley experiment provided evidence that the concept could be discarded from physics.
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contrast to specific theories, are a “much more general, much less easily testable, set
of doctrines or assumptions” (Laudan 1977, p. 71). For example, it is certainly not
a trivial task to experimentally disprove the metaphysical commitments of computa-
tionalism or Bayesian cognitive science. So how should one evaluate EC as a research
tradition?
The increase or decrease of the problem-solving effectiveness is the measure of the
progressiveness of a research tradition.9 On Laudan’s account, one can focus on the
general progress “by comparing the adequacy of the sets of theories which constitute
the oldest and those which constitute the most recent versions of the research tradition”
(Laudan 1977, p. 107), and on the momentary rate of progress during any specified
time span. The momentary progress may be stalled owing to a lack of appropriate
measurement apparatus, for example.
Let us then consider how this could be applied to the problem at hand: the expla-
nation of the word frequency effect. The momentary rate of progress of EC for this
problem is simply zero. Now, the question is whether EC could make progress on this
problem in the future—and whether it should. A proponent of EC explanations for a
limited scope of problems, for example, those related to sensorimotor processing, may
reject the diagnosis offered by Goldinger et al. (2016), simply by saying that EC is
not committed to solving all problems in cognitive science (e.g., Wołoszyn and Hohol
2017 offer such a reply). However, Glenberg or Schubert and Semin have no such
option because they claim that EC does unify (almost) all cognitive science.
Thus, what Goldinger et al. (2016) suggest is simply this: EC has no methodological
or metaphysical commitments that could help in offering an alternative explanation
of the word frequency effect. Just because the word frequency effect is a classical
explanandum in cognitive science, any respectable attempt at unifying all cognitive
science should include it. The standard models of the effect usually refer to learning
dynamics (often simulated using artificial neural networks implementing learning rules
that are considered explanatory for the phenomenon). For example, Goldinger et al.
refer to Hebb’s learning rule “neurons that fire together, wire together” (2016, p. 965).
Still, learning is not on the list of phenomena listed by Glenberg (2010). However,
he lists memory, and there are several phenomena cited by Goldinger et al. (2016)
that are directly related to memory (serial recall, implicit memory, working memory
capacity) that seem to have no embodied explanation—and it is unclear how one could
be built. In other words, it is unlikely that EC can scale up to cover the phenomena
listed by Goldinger et al., including memory, listed as already covered by Glenberg
[for his approach to memory, see (Glenberg 1997)].
In other words, the assessment of EC as progressive with respect to such problems
depends on how one understands the proper problem domain of EC. As Goldinger
et al. say, “EC proponents selectively focus on a subset of domains that work, while
9 In his recent defense of an alternative account, Bird (2007) criticized Laudan’s approach for eschewing
the issue of truth or adequacy in scientific progress [for a short overview of current accounts of scientific
progress, see (Dellsén 2018)]. Indeed, Laudan (1981, p. 145) claimed that “we evidently have no way
of ascertaining whether our theories are more truthlike or more nearly certain than they formerly were.”
According to Bird, this leads Laudan to conflate an actual solution of a problem with something that is
merely assessed to be a solution. However, Laudan’s account need not be understood this way: a scientific
realist may, in spite of Laudan’s comments, simply assume that only actual solutions to scientific problems
may contribute to progress.
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ignoring nearly all the bedrock findings that define cognitive science” (2016, p. 961).
However, only some proponents of EC, such as Glenberg, would readily accept the
challenge to explain all the bedrock findings that define cognitive science. Note that
one can apply, again, Laudan’s criteria of progress to underline that there actually are
“domains that work”; ECL has inspired a flurry of research in cognitive linguistics and
experimental psychology as well (Lakoff 2012): Experimental studies show that being
leaned forward can underwrite desires (Harmon-Jones et al. 2011, 2012), holding a
hot cup makes the person we talk to more warm and trustworthy (Williams and Bargh
2008), experienced temperature influences the emotional tone of memories (Zhong
and Leonardelli 2008), etc.
ECL, even if diversified, remains committed to a set of research heuristics that point
out sensorimotor factors as possibly explanatory for phenomena such as metaphors
(Miłkowski 2019). Understood as offering a narrower set of explanations, EC remains
unified to a degree: while it does not explain all the findings of cognitive science,
it offers a specific perspective on some of its phenomena. Usually, this is achieved
by extrapolation of the same or similar mechanisms to explain multiple phenomena,
as in the case of sensorimotor factors used to explain abstract cognition. In general,
subtraditions of EC are quite constrained in their theoretical commitments, and thus
they would eschew Newell’s (1973) charge of increasing fragmentation of cognitive
psychology. Representational unification can be achieved locally, for a limited num-
ber of problems that a research tradition tackles, without offering a grand theory of
everything.
But for Goldinger et al. (2016), the scope and generality of EC thus conceived is
insufficient, and there is no systematic way to increase it in the future. EC remains
essentially incomplete and impoverished according to this criticism. In other words,
the charge against new proposals in cognitive science that they will not “scale up”
(e.g., Edelman 2003) is simply meant to say this: the research tradition in question
has no resources to offer a unified view on cognition; it has a limited scope and is
insufficiently systematic to be developed further. Interestingly, as this is a frequent
charge, it strongly suggests that researchers in cognitive science assume that general
frameworks for explaining cognition should be at least to some degree unified. Oth-
erwise, proponents of yet another approach to cognition could simply bite the bullet
and ignore the criticism.
In our analysis, representations of smaller scope still count as unified as long as they
do not form a disunified body of research, i.e., as long as they are relatively simple,
appropriately general, non-monstrous, and systematic. Surely, different subtraditions
impose more or less strict constraints on what they deem satisfactory explanations.
For example, ecological psychology as a subtradition in EC appeals to environmen-
tal constraints and to the notion of affordance in most explanations, whereas ECL
appeals to bodily underpinnings of metaphors. While these subtraditions are distinct,
their explanatory texts remain theoretically uniform, and can be hardly confused with
one another. This way, they systematically build a relatively uniform body of explana-
tory representations in a distributed fashion. In other words, unified explanations of
cognition need not rely on a monolithic model of cognitive mechanisms. They can be
constrained by a distributed set of methodological and theoretical commitments of a
particular research (sub)tradition.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we pointed out that at least some research traditions in cognitive science
aim at offering unified representations of cognitive phenomena. Even if actual theo-
rizing in cognitive science is very fragmented, and cognitive science is itself a grand
research tradition that encompasses many competitive and sometimes even mutu-
ally exclusive subtraditions, methodological and theoretical debates clearly show that
researchers care about unification. We proposed a new multidimensional account of
representational unification, which includes factors such as simplicity, generality and
scope, non-monstrosity, and systematicity.
At the same time, we stressed that representational unification should not be con-
flated with representational integration, as they impose different commitments, nor
with scope, which is but one of its four dimensions. Whereas more general represen-
tations could be more unified, the scope of problems solved by a research tradition
need not be arbitrarily high. To be unified, an explanatory mechanistic representation
need not be a grand theory of everything. It simply has to be a good explanatory text.
An explanatory text can and usually should be selective. There is no principle that
requires EC to be a unified theory of all cognition.
In the past, the defenders of the mechanistic approach almost exclusively studied
representational integration; unification was mentioned mostly in passing. This could
be because of the suspicion that unification implies that nature is itself unified; as
Newton stated, “Nature is wont to be simple and consonant unto itself.” But new
mechanists, predominantly scientific realists, have doubts about whether such a claim
could be true. Thus, they could think of unification as a purely epistemic virtue related
to our theoretical interests and pragmatic considerations. Hence, even a dappled world
could be explained, at least to some extent, in a unified fashion. A successful mech-
anistic theory of a class of phenomena should cover them all systematically, while
remaining simple and non-monstrous. Otherwise, if it fails to be systematic, is overly
complex or fairly incomplete, or has totally disconnected parts, it does not constitute
a satisfactory explanatory text, but a mere collection of unrelated bits and pieces.
Unification is thus not an optional feature of mechanistic theories in contrast to mere
mechanistic models. If one strives to build a theory that can systematically explain a
given domain of phenomena, one must follow the normative guidelines that effectively
require striving for representational unification.10
We stressed that Laudan’s focus on research traditions has allowed us to better
understand the dynamics of cognitive explanations. In the past, new mechanists mostly
studied fields and inter-field integration. We consider our perspective complementary
and suited for understanding the scientific practice and programmatic debates. In other
words, if we focused on fields, we could not really clarify why Goldinger et al. criti-
cize EC: cognitive science is not a well-defined field but a conglomerate of multiple
overlapping and partially integrated fields. There is no single problem of cognition,
which can be evidenced by the fact that there is no consensus, among different fields,
on how to conceptualize cognition (Akagi 2018). But cognitive science is a grand
research tradition that has a historically growing number of problems to be solved,
10 However, the issue of what constitutes a mechanistic theory goes beyond the scope of this paper.
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including explaining classical cognitive phenomena, which remain exemplars for cur-
rent cognitive scientists. This is why talk of research traditions is particularly fruitful
for this case. There are also other advantages of our approach related to mechanistic
explanation, but they will be developed in a different study.
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